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RECENT CASES
CONTRACTs-EVIDENCE-RECITAL OF CONSIDERATION IN UNSEALED OPTION

As CoNcLusrvE-Defendant delivered to the plaintiff an unsealed instrument
reading, "In consideration of One Dollar in hand paid, I hereby give you the
option to purchase my property . . .within six days". The dollar was neither
paid nor demanded and prior to the acceptance, the defendant attempted to
revoke. The plaintiff brought a bill for specific performance. Held, that the
plaintiff must specifically perform since the option was supported by consideration and therefore irrevocable. Real Estate Co. of Pittsburgh v. Rudolph, 3o
Pa. 502, 153 Adt. 438 (i93o).

It is a rule of the civil law that an offer is irrevocable during the period
specified for its existence but this has never been the rule of the common law
because of the prevailing doctrine of consideration. Under our familiar rules,
an offer, unless supported by consideration or under seal, may be revoked by the
offeror at any time prior to its acceptance by the offeree.' Once, however, such
an offer or promise is supported by consideration, or made under seal, it is
given the status of a contract, and thereafter one party is helpless to prevent its
operation without incurring liability. An option, i. e., an offer or promise by
which the owner of property agrees to give another the right to buy it at a
fixed price within a specific time, may fall within either of the above classes.There being no question of a seal involved in the instant case, the sole problem
for determination was the presence or absence of a consideration for the option.
A universally accepted definition of consideration is "A detriment to the
Although, it is obvious from the facts
promisee or a benefit to the promisor".'
that no actual consideration here passed, nevertheless the court found that which
they termed 'legal consideration". Their theory seems.to be that, having recited
the receipt of a consideration in a written instrument, the reciter is thereby
estopped to deny that fact and that the reciter is prohibited by the parol evidence
rule from showing the facts to be otherwise than as recited Such a holding,
'Byrne v. Van Tienhoven, 5 C. P. Div. 344 347 (88o) ; Fisher v. Seltze,
23 Pa. 3o8 (1854); Vincent v. Woodland Oil Co., i65 Pa. 402, 3o Atl. 99I
(1894).
' For definition of option, see Gibbs v. Piper, 153 Atl. 674, 676 (Del. 1930).
The cases show clearly that the revocability of an option depends on the presence
of a seal or consideration. Willard v. Tayloe, 75 U. S. 557 (1870) (sealed
options valid and irrevocable); Thomason v. Bescher, 176 N. C. 622, 97 S. E
654 (I918); Cummins v. Beavers, ioa Va. 230, 48 S. E. 89i (1904) (paid-for
option irrevocable) ; Bosshardt v. Crescent Oil Co., 171 Pa. i09, 32 Atl. ii2o
(i895) (revocation permitted, in absence of seal or consideration) ; Boston &
Maine v. Bartlet, 2 Cush. 224 (Mass. 1849) (here an acceptance before offer
was revoked.
IRector St. Mark's Church v. Teed, 12o N. Y. 583, 24 N. E. 1014 (1890);
Ames, Two Theoriev of Consideration., (1899) IZHAv. L. RExV. 515; ANSON,
LAw OF CONTRAcTs (ioth ed., i9o3) 87.
'After advancing the reasons above outlined, Simpson, J., at 5o7, states,
"It is elementary that the consideration imported from the use of a seal on
such paper, may not be contradicted by proof. In the light of this, it would
neither be consistent nor logical to hold that the intentional insertion of an
("39)
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upon principle, seems exceedingly difficult to justify. Its sole support from the
standpoint of precedent is a decision by Justice Story' in an almost identical
case, and the dicta of various other cases.' To the contrary, there are the wellestablished and fundamental principles of the law of Contracts and Evidence
which both cases seem to disregard. An estoppel would seem inapplicable in
the absence of any element of reliance on the part of the offended party.7 Here
both parties knew the facts, and the recital of a fact known by both to be false
could have deceived no one and certainly could not have furnished a basis for
justifiable reliance. Then too, it has been stated and seems correct that there
is no such thing as estoppel by writing beyond the limits of the parol evidence
actual consideration may be overthrown whenever one of the parties desires to
escape liability." But it is not perceived why this would be neither "logical
nor consistent". In the first place it is not strictly accurate to say as did the
court that a sealed instrument "imports" consideration. Rather, they derive their
validity from historical considerations and are binding because of the solemnity
of their execution even in the admitted absence of any consideration. Clymer v.
Groff, 22o Pa. 58o, 69 Atl. 1119 (igog) ; Krell v. Codman, 154 Mass. 454, 28
N. E. 578 (1891). This being so the difference between a sealed and an unsealed
instrument would seem to be the very reason why the opposite rule should apply,
and 5allow the contradiction in the case of latter.
Lawrence v.McCalmont, 43 U. S. 426 (1844). The essential facts of this
case were the same as those in the principal case, except that the instrument in
question was a guaranty At 452, Story, J., says, "The guarantor acknowledged
the receipt of the dollar and is now estopped to deny it."
'The statement by the court in Piper v. Queeney, 282 Pa. 135, 142, 127, Aft.

474, 477 (1925) seems to fairly illustrate the feeling of courts in virtually
all the cases cited. It was there said, "Where a consideration is relied on in a
contract under seal or otherwise it may be inquired into by parol, although the
result is to show the consideration set forth is not the real one as long as nothing
is permitted to be proven directly inconsistent with the coiwideration, named
in the instrument itself" (italics the writer's). The court in the principal case
lays great stress on the italicized clause. But note that in the case cited the
contract was under seal, and the evidence was admitted to show that the consideration was lacking. The court goes on to say that failure of consideration
can always be shown "for this instead of attempting to change the terms of a
contract gives a reason why it should not be carried out."
Other cases cited by the court can generally be distinguished on one of two
grounds. In some, the courts were considering sealed instruments which should
be governed by different rules, being binding irrespective of consideration. The
greater portion of the cases, however, are those in which the court actually
admitted the evidence which varied the writing on the theory that they were
not "directly inconsistent". Many of these latter were also under seal. Thus,
in Watkins v. Robertson, 1O5 Va. 269, 54 S.E. 33 (i9o6), the option was under
seal, as was the deed in question in Hagen v. Lehman, 317 Ill. 227, 148 N. E.
57 (1?25). In Horbach v. Coyle, 2 F. (2d) 702 (C. C. A. 8th 1924), evidence
was admitted to show that the consideration was illegal. In the following cases
the evidence was admitted to show additional consideration. Nichols v. Nichols,
133 Pa. 438, ig Atl. 422 (189o) ; Buckley's Appeal, 48 Pa. 491 (1895) ; McGary v. McDermott, 2o7 Pa. 620, 57 Ad. 46 (19o4) ; Henry v. Zurflieh, 203 Pa.
440, 53 AtI. 243 (1902).

In Lewis v. Brewster, 57 Pa. 410 (1868), evidence was

admitted to show land was deeded as a gift, or, as the court said, that love
and affection rather than the sum recited was the consideration. In none of
these cases was evidence excluded such as that which was unsuccessfully sought
to be7 admitted in the principal case.
BIGELoW, ESTOPPEL (6th ed. 1913) 490; EVEREST & STRODE, LAW OF ESTOP-

PEL

(3rd ed. 1923) 237, 238.
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rule.0 Perhaps this is a mere difference in terminology; it really matters not
whether the evidence is excluded because of an estoppel or by virtue of the opertion of the parol evidence rule. But, as has been pointed out, the former should
not be applicable, and neither should the parol evidence rule apply because the
correct construction of this rule is that it forbids simply the showing that the
promise is not as stated, and has no application to recitals of fact such as exist
in the principal case.9 Of the identical situation here under discussion, Professor Williston has said,'" "It would be destructive of the doctrine of consideration to hold an admission of consideration in an unsealed writing estopped
the promisor in favor of the promisee, who of course knew the actual facts,
from showing that no consideration passed . . . If the mere saying in writing
that a fictitious consideration has been received will make a promise binding,
a new and hitherto unacknowledged obligation has been created." In view of
this illuminating comment it seems indeed unfortunate that the court should
have followed the reasoning of a century-old decision in arriving at its conclusion. One factor, unmentioned in the opinion, is worthy of note inasmuch
as it may have helped the court in reachihg its result, and may to some extent
furnish a sound basis for the decision. Pennsylvania has adopted the Uniform
Written Obligations Act ' which provides that a written promise shall not be
ineffective for want of consideration or a seal, providing it contains an additional expressed statement that the signer intended to be bound. Although "A
dollar in hand paid" was undoubtedly not the sort of an additional express
statement which the framers of the act had in mind," it does have some tendency
to show that the signer was doing his best to draw a legally effective instrument.
This fact and the general policy behind such statutes would seem to lend considerable support to the result reached, if not to the method of reaching it.0

CoaPoaRATroNs-Fo iGN CORPORATIONS-COMMERCE CrAusE-DoCTRINE OF
UNcoNSrrrTUroTIONAL CONDITONS-Plaintiff, a foreign public utility corporation,
engaged in interstate commerce in Virginia, petitioned for a license to do
therein an intrastate business. A Virginia statute provides that licenses to
engage in intrastate business shall not be issued to foreign public utility corporations. The statute further provides that the associates of the corporation may,
however, reincorporate in Virginia and that the domestic corporation thus
"I WILLISTON CONTRACTS (1920)

§ 1sa.

Ibid.

20Ibid.
'Act 1927, P. L. 475. "Section I. Be it enacted, etc., That a written
release or promise, hereafter made, and signed by the person releasing or promising, shall not be invalid or unenforceable for lack of consideration, if the

writing also contains an additional express statement, in any form of language,
that the signer intends to be legally bound."
'HANDBOOK

OF NATIONAL

CONFERENCE OF COMiISSIONERS ON UNIFORM

STATE LA.s (1925) 195 et seq.; Note (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 58o.
'A lucid and interesting discussion of the principal case is in Note (i93i)
35 DICK. L. REv. 143.
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formed may be licensed and thereafter consolidate with the foreign corporation.
Plaintiff refused to reincorporate and was consequently denied a license. Appeal
was made on the ground that the reincorporation statute is unconstitutional
because (I) it imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce, and (2) it
deprives plaintiff of its constitutional privilege to sue in, and remove to, federal
courts in Virginia. Held, that the statute is constitutional. Railway Express
Agency v. Virginia., 51 Sup. Ct. 2ol (1931).
For a discussion of the several issues involved see Note (1931) 79 U. OF PA.
L. REv. ante, p. iii9.

CORPORATIONS-SHAREHOLDns-VALIDITY

OF CONTRACT TO VOTE IN

SPECI-

MANNER-Plaintiff owned one-half of the shares of a corporation. He
sold a part of his shares to defendant upon the latter's promise that he would
at all times be controlled in voting his shares by the wishes and judgment of
plaintiff. Defendant manifested an intention not to be bound by his promise
at a forthcoming shareholders' meeting. Plaintiff thereupon brought a bill
FIED

for an injunction to compel defendant to carry out the agreement.

Held, that

the agreement was fraudulent as to the other shareholders and would not be
enforced. Creed v. Copps, 152 Atl. 369 (Vt. 1930).
In a leading Connecticut case, involving a voting trust, the court said,
"A contract by which the real owner's power is hampered by a provision therein
that he shall vote just as somebody else dictates, is objectionable."' This states
a rule which seems too broad. It is true that a shareholder may not enforce a
promise made to him in consideration of his voting for or against a proposed
measure,' unless all of the other shareholders know of the promise A purchaser of shares is not liable in damages for failure to fulfill an agreement
with the seller to vote for another as an officer of the corporation.4 But a
shareholder may appoint another person his proxy with full power to vote in
his discretion and he will be bound by the acts of the proxy ' unless the latter
acts in bad faith.' Within limitations, the courts of most states will not, at the
instance of a party thereto, dissolve a voting trust established to assure control
'Bostwick v. Chapman (Shepaug Voting Trust Cases), 6o Conn. 553, 579,
Atl. 32, 41 (1890) (a trust agreement whereby the trustees were to vote as
directed by persons having no interest in the shares; the suit, being by one of the
parties to the agreement, to withdraw therefrom); Luthy v. Ream, 27o Ill.
24

i7O, iio N. E. 373 (1915)

(trust agreement cancelled at suit of party thereto).
Ill. App. 279 (192I); Palmbaum v. Magulsky, 217
Mass. 3o6, io4 N. E. 746 (1914).

'Brady v. Bean,

221

'Keady v. United Rys. Co., 57 Ore. 325, ioo Pac. 658 (igio).
'West v. Camden, 135 U. S. 5o7, 10 Sup. Ct. 838 (189o);

Guernsey v.

Cook, 12o Mass. 5O (1876) ; Cone v. Russel, 48 N. J. Eq. 208, 21 Atl. 847
(18gi).
'Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Nicholas, 98 Ala. 92, 12 So. 723 (1892).
'Lowman v. Pierce Co., 276 Pa. 382, 12o At. 4o4 (1923) (acts of proxy
annulled).
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7

of the corporate affairs or to protect creditors
Similarly, the courts recognize
the validity of acts done in pursuance of pooling agreements, whereby the members of the pool agree to vote as the majority of their number shall dictate.9
In short, the validity of voting agreements seems to depend upon whether the
parties bind themselves in advance to vote in a designated manner upon a certain
issue. The probable reason for this is that it may not always remain in the
best interests of the corporation to vote in the manner agreed upon. Viewed
in this light, it is difficult to see in what manner the agreement in the instant
case offends against public policy, since it did not require defendant to vote in
any pre-arranged manner." Moreover, the fact that plaintiff was himself a
shareholder renders it unlikely that he would use his power in a fashion injurious to the corporation. It, therefore, seems that the court erred in holding
the agreement fraudulent and in refusing plaintiff the relief sought by him.

EMINENT DOMAIN-PowER OF A STATE TO TAKE LAND FOR THE USE OF THE
FEDERAL Gov.RNMEN -Plantiff sought to enjoin the defendant, a commission

vested by the state with the power of eminent domain, from taking plaintiff's
property which was to be used as a public park, on the ground thaf the park was
later to be conveyed to the Federal Government. Held, that the defendant
would not be enjoined. Rudacille v. State Commission on Conservation, I56
S. E. 829 (Va. I931).
It is generally conceded that the power of eminent domain inheres in a state
to serve the public necessities of its own citizens' and cannot be exercised solely
for the use of other sovereign powers.-2 If the individual state and the United
States are regarded as separate entities, each sovereign in its own sphere, the
court in the instant case seems incorrect in holding that a state government may
condemn land to be conveyed to a foreign power even though the use of the
land accrues primarily to the public welfare of the state. Such a holding would
be opposed to the traditional concept of eminent domain in permitting the establishment of a rival power within the borders of the sovereignty and would be
7Chapman v. Bates, 61 N. J. Eq. 658, 47 Atl. 638 (19oo) ; Boyer v. Nesbitt, 227 Pa. 398, 76 At. io3 (igio). Cmtra: Bostwick v. Chapman (Shepaug
Voting Trust Cases) ; Luthy v. Ream, both supra note I.
'Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Ellis Granite Co., 86 Vt. 282, 84 Ad. 1017
(1912).
ISmith v. San Francisco, etc., Ry., 115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582 (1897);
Faulds v. Yates, 57 Ill. 416, 11 Am. Rep. 24 (187o).
0
With two exceptions, all of the cases cited by the court in support of
the decision involve illegality of purpose. Moreover, Vermont expressly upholds
voting trust agreements where the purpose is legitimate: Thompson-Starrett
Co. v. Ellis Granite Co., mupra note 8.
'See I LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN (3rd ed. igo9) §3io; People v.
Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471, 474 (1871).
'GrGver Irrigation Etc. Co. v. Lovella Ditch Co., 21 Wyo. 204, I3 Pa=. 43
(913) ; see I NicHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1917) § 29.
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unconstitutional if applied in the case of another state' or of a nation foreign
to the United States. On the other hand, if the theory is adopted that the state
and the Federal governments are integral parts of the same sovereign power,
the conclusion is inevitable that when the state condemns land for the Federal
Government, it condemns land for the sovereign. Although the theory of the
court in the instant case is not clearly indicated, the basis of the decision is that
the citizens of the state will receive the major benefit from the establishment
of the park, even though it is to be placed under the control of the United
4
States. Whether this conclusion is correct from a practical standpoint depends
on a number of factors such as the cost of maintaining the park, the loss to the
state of its natural resources, and the possible failure on the part of the government to advertise the park properly. In the absence, however, of any positive
evidence that special benefit would accrue from Federal dominion over the park
or that the Federal government would anyhow condemn land for the park in case
the state failed to do so,' the decision in the instant case can hardly find sanction
under the doctrine that the power of eminent domain, being in derogation of a
common property right, is in cases of doubt to be construed in favor of the landowner.' On the whole the decision reflects the recent liberal tendency of courts to
favor a policy of employing state machinery to condemn land for projects'
originating in the national government.

EQUITY-TRUST

AGREEMENT-PROVISION,

SECURING

CORPORATE

BONDS,

GrvING TRUSTEE ExcLusIvE POWER To ENFORCE SECuRITY-Plaintiff, holder of

one bond and certain stock of the X Corporation brought suit to recover on the
bond and collateral in the form of a trust fund in the hands of Bank. Other
bondholders, holding about one-sixth of the bond issue thus secured, joined.
The Bank and Corporation defended on the ground that the plaintiffs, because
of provisions in the trust agreement, could not act against the security thus
placed in hands of trustees. Held, that the provisions in the trust deed giving
the trustee exclusive right to enforce it were void as ousting the jurisdiction
of the courts. First Nat. Bauk of Dallas v. Brown, 34 S. W. (2d) 412 (Tex.
1930).

' Columbus Water Works v. Long, 121 Ala. 245, 25 So. 7o2 (899) ; People
v. Humphrey, szpra note I; Grover v. Lovella Co., supra note Z. But see
Rogers v. Toccoa Electric Power Co., 163 Ga. 919, 137 S. E. 272 (1927) ; (1928)
28 CoL. L. REv. 105.
Principal case at 834.
' The usual practice is for the United States to condemn directly, by authority of an act of Congress, the property which it needs, Kohl v. United States,
91 U. S. 367 (875).
'See Downing v. State, 214 Ala. i99, 2o0, IO7 So. 8o (1926) ; Binney's
Case, 2 Bland 99, i29 (Md. 1829); Wise v. Yazoo City, 96 Miss. 507, 519, 5r
So. 453, 455 (1910).

'Yarborough v. Park Commission, 196 N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563 (1928);
Contra: People v.
Lancey v. King County, 15 Wash. 9, 45 Pac. 645 (8W6).
Humphrey, supra note I.
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Parties may by contract impose certain reasonable restrictions on their
rights to exercise judicial remedies.' Hence provisions in corporate bonds that
bondholders, before proceeding against the security held by a trustee, be required
to give notice to the trustee, or wait until the trustee has refused to act at their
request, or gain the consent of a majority of holders of that issue, are perfectly
valid.
Such provisions have been held to apply to actions both on the bond
or on the mortgage
They are considered as designed for the better security of
all, and as such are reasonable restrictions in corporate financial methods.' In
the present case, however, it was definitely provided that only the trustee could
enforce the security, and the bondholder's only remedy on default of interest
or of principal was, on refusal of action by the trustee, to petition for a new
trustee or proceed to get a personal and unsecured judgment against the corporation.' This was held to be an attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the courts
and hence illegal. Consequently, none of the steps outlined in the trust agreement had to be taken prior to legal action.6 Although there is one case squarely
contra,7 the decision in the instant case is in complete accord with the general
rule as applied to arbitral contracts,' insurance agreements,9 and situations where
'In Re Patterson-MacDonald Shipbuilding Co., 284 Fed. 277 (W. D. Wash.
aff. 292 Fed. 700 (1923). Neterer, J., at 279 said, "However parties are
not permitted on the ground of public policy to close access to the courts, but
may as a condition precedent to application to the court, agree to a mode of
settlement out of court, and where such proceeding is provided then a party
must offer . . . to have the matter concluded in accordance with such stipulations before invoking the court's jurisdiction."
' Cochran v. Pittsburgh S. & N. R. Co., i5o Fed. 682 (W. D. N. Y. i9o7);
Seibert v. Minnesota & St. L. R. R., 52 Minn. 148, 53 N. W. 1134 (1893);
Muren v. Southern Coal & Mining Co., 177 Mo. App. 6oo, i6o S. W. 835 (913);
3 JoNEs MORTGAGFS (8th Ed. 1928) §§ 177, 2295.
'2Belleville Savings Bank v. Coal & Mining Co., 173 Ill.
250 (1912) ; Seibert
v. Minnesota & St. L. R. R., supra: note 2.
'Murren v. Southern Coal & Mining Co., supra note 2 at 6o5, i6o S. W. 836,
"It is the policy of the law to sustain the validity of such reasonable provisions
inserted in a mortgage deed securing an issue of bonds which are designed to
pass into the hands of separate individual holders for the better security of all,
as such security should not be impaired by the conduct of one or of a few ...
Such stipulations are not viewed as tending to oust the court of jurisdiction
• . . but rather as wholesome restrictions imposed for the better security of
all concerned."
'Principal case at 416, "The security hereby created and held by said trustee
under this indenture shall be enforced only by and through said trustee, but any
holders whose bond is due and unpaid may sue the said company thereon and
obtain a personal judgment against it."
'Walthall, J., in instant case at 417, 'Wethink it necessary follows that
if the trust agreement is void as against public policy . . . it would not be
necessary to the proper statement of a cause of action that demand had been
made of the trustee to enforce appellees' rights against the trust proprety . . Y
T
Jones et al. v. Atlantic & W. M. R., 193 N. C. 59o, 137 S. E. 706 (I927).
'Johnston v. Franklin Kirk Co., 83 Ind. App. 519, 148 N. E. 177 (1925);
Saratoga State Waters Corp. v. Pratt, 227 N. Y. 429, 125 N. E. 834 (i92o).
I McCormick v. Woodman of World, 57 Cal. App. 568, 207 Pac. 943 (1922).
Bauer v. Samson Lodge, 1o2 Ind. 262, 1 N. E. 57i (1885) ; Supreme Lodge v.
Raymond, 57 Kan. 617, 47 Pac. 533 (897).
1922),
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the parties attempt to prevent appeals to the courts or to prescribe the evidence
which shall or shall not be required'
Sane restrictions, aimed at the protection
of all the holders of a bond issue secured by property in the hands of a trustee
are unquestionably necessary, but decisions like the one under discussion are
proper steps in the protection of the rapidly growing investing public.

EvIDENCE-WITNESSEs-ADMIlSSIBILITY OF WiiEs
OF HER HUSBAND'S

CO-DEFENDANT-D

TEsTIMoNY

IN

FAVOR

and F were jointly indicted for con-

spiracy. After F had rested his case, D offered F's wife as a witness. D
admitted that F's wife could not testify to anything which would not be in
defence of F as well as of D. D's motion for a separate trial was denied. Held,
that F's wife was not a competent witness, and that the trial court's refusal
of a severance was not reviewable. Dowdy v. United States, 46 F. (2d) 417
(C. C. A. 4th, 1931).
The federal courts firmly adhere to the common law rule that a wife is not
a competent witness in favor of her husband, notwithstanding that the husband
has been made by statute a competent witness in his own defence. This marital
disqualification, wherever it still prevails, is uniformly held to prevent the wife
from giving evidence in favor of her husband's co-defendant if her testimony
at all tends to exculpate her husband as well as his co-defendant.' But because
of the difficulty of limiting beforehand the testimony of the wife to only those
matters which cannot affect her husband, and because the wife is assumed to be
biased whenever her husband is a party to the litigation, some courts have gone
further and have held that where co-defendants are jointly tried the wife of
one is never admissible as a witness for the others. Several federal cases contain statements broad enough to indicate an adoption of the latter rule, though
without squarely deciding the question
The principal case, however, limits its
own statement of the ratio decidendi to the former rule, as sufficient to cover
0Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 82 Fed. 510
(C. C. A. 6th, 1897) ; International Traveler's Ass'n v. Branum, iog Tex. 543,
212 S. W.

630 (I919).

3in

'Hendrix v. United States, 219 U. S. 79, 31 Sup. Ct. 193 (191);
Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U. S. I89, 41 Sup. Ct 98 (920).
'Dean v. State, i39 Ark. 433, 214 S. W. 38 (i919); Stephens v. State,
io6 Ga. 116, 32 S.E. 13 (I898) ; People v. Holtz, 294 Ill.I43, 128 N. E. 341
(I92O) ; State v. Sargood, 77 Vt 8o, 58 Atl. 97i (i9o4).
It is sufficient to exclude the wife that her testimony will tend to impeach a witness for the prosecution who has given evidence against both defendants, Gillespie v. People, 176
Il1. 238, 52 N. E. 250 (i898).
'Holley v. State, io5 Ala. ioo, i7 So. 102 (1895); Commonwealth v.
Robinson, I Gray 555 (Mass. 1854); Hawkesworth v. Shower, i2 M. & W.
45 (1843); Reg. v. Thompson, 12 Cox C. C. 202 (1872). And see 5 CHAMBERLAYNE, EVIDENCE (I916)
§3656; 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (x6th ed. I899)
§ 334; 1 WIGaoRE, EVIDEN cE (2d ed. 1923) § 6o2.
'Talbott v. United States, 2o8 Fed. I44 (C. C. A. 5th, 1913) ; United States
v. Davidson, 285 Fed. 661 (E. D. Pa. 1922); Haddad v. United States, 294
Fed. .536 (C. C. A. 6th. 1923).
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the situation presented to the court.' While the great weight of authority holds
a wife's testimony admissible for her husband's co-defendant where each is
being tried separately,' there is authority for the proposition that the wife would
not be competent at a separate trial under a joint indictment for conspiracy,
since in such circumstances the acquittal of his co-defendant would also necessarily result in the husband's acquittal.7 This latter question is left unsettled
by the principal case because rendered unnecessary to its disposition by a longestablished rule that the granting of a severance in order to circumvent the
marital disqualification is a subject solely within the discretion of the trial
court.8

GiFTs-DELvERY OF A WRITING AS AN INTER Vivos GIFT OF STOCK EXSEAT-Decedent, a member of the Pittsburgh Stock Exchange, executed
the following instrument in writing: "Please give my daughter . .
my
seat in the Exchange". Decedent signed his name, and delivered the instrument to his daughter. The executors of the decedent's state included the value
of the Seat in their inventory, and the daughter, the principal legatee under
decedent's will, excepts to their claims for commissions, claiming the Seat to be
her property. Held, that the Seat was not a part of the estate because the
decedent made a valid gift to his daughter of the Seat. McLag1ldin 's Estate,
14 D. & C. 665 (Pa. 193o).
Intangible property interests play such a large part in modern law, that
old common law principles have been modified or dispensed with entirely.' The
historical development of the requisites for gifts inter vivos affords an excellent
illustration. At first, the subject of the gift itself had to be handed over to
the donee before the gift was complete. Later, the law recognized a deed of
transfer as sufficient to effectuate a valid gift. Where the subject matter of the
gift was not capable of delivery, because of its intangible quality, then this
latter method of donation was essential. Finally, delivery of that which the law
recognized as tangible evidence of the property interest to be transferred was
considered sufficient to complete the gift. Thus, a gift may be made of one's
ownership in a corporation by the mere manual tradition of an unindorsed
CHANGE

Similar reticence was shown in Israel v. United States, 3 F. (2d) 743
(C. C. A. 6th, 1925).
'United States v. Addatte, 6 Blatch. 76 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1868) ; State v.
Anthony, I McCord 285 (S. C. 1821); see Commonwealth v. Eastland, i Mass.
I5 (1804).
7 Commonwealth v. Manson, 2 Ashm. 31 (Phila. 1833) ; see United States
v. Addatte, supra note 6; Rex v. Locker, 5 Esp. io7 (Eng. 1804) ; Hawkesworth v. Showler, supranote 3, at 49.
8
United States v. Marchant, 12 Wheat 480 (1827); Talbott v. United
States, supra note 4; Commonwealth v. Robinson, supra note 3.
'See generally the following: Pollock, Gifts of Chattels Without Delivery,

(i8go) 6 L. Q. REV. 446; Costigan, Gifts Inter Vivos of Choses, i Aclion,
27 L. Q. REv. 326; Bruton, Requirement of Delivery As Applied to
Gifts of Choses in Action, (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 837.
(19I1)
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stock certificate.' The great majority of courts held that the delivery of a
savings bank book to the donee is an irrevocable parting with the donor's chose
in action against the bank 3 A Pennsylvania court has held that a contract for
the sale of land may be the subject of a gift inter vivos.' A seat on a stock
exchange, however, is a peculiar species of property, if it be considered property
at all.' It combines within it the characteristics of a club membership with those
of a share of stock. Whatever may be its nature, one thing is certain-the business world of today treats a stock exchange seat as property. It is traded in
on the floor of the Exchange, and it is one of the chief assets of a brokerage
house. If the seat may be sold, there is no reasorx of policy which should prevent it from being given away. The fact that the donee will have to prove
acceptable to the Stock Exchangd is no objection; that condition inheres in the
gift. The instant case decides that an unsealed writing, directing the transfer
of the Seat, is sufficient formality to constitute a valid gift of the Seat. There
was no doubt in the case but that the donor intended to make a gift of the Seat,
and once the court finds this element present, no further formality should be
required. The only practical reason for the seal is to assure the court that the
necessary intent was present; 6 that reason is not present when the intent has
been proven by other means.' The principal case well illustrates the modern
tendency of the law to dispense with rigidity and useless formality; practicability
and convenience have taken their place.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE-VALIDITY OF STATE TAx ON RADIO RECEIVING SETS

-A South Carolina statute imposed an annual license tax upon radio receiving
sets. Plaintiff, a foreign corporation, a large percentage of whose audience was
located in South Carolina, brought suit to enjoin the collection of the tax.
'Herbert v. Simpson, 22o Mass. 480, loS N. E. 65 (1915) ; Pryor v. Morgan, 170 Pa. 568, 33 Atl. 98 (1895).
' Hill v. Stevenson, 63 Me. 364 (1873). Contra,: Walsh's Appeal, 122 Pa.
177, 15 Atl. 47o (1888), the court deciding that there was no irrevocable parting

with control.
'Huggins's Estate, 204 Pa. 167, 53 Atl. 746 (19o2).

'The Penna. courts hold that a stock exchange seat is not property; that it
cannot be seized in execution for debts, Thompson v. Adams, 93 Pa. 55 (1879) ;
Gartner v. Pittsburgh Stock Exchange, 247 Pa. 482, 93 Atl. 759 (1915).

But the

weight of authority and the better view is to the contrary, Page v. Edmunds, 187

U. S. 596, 23 Sup. Ct. 2oo (1903) ; In Re Stringer, 253 Fed. 352 (C. C. A. 2d,
1918). See Note (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 544, 545.

Note the following quotation from the opinion of the court in the principal
case: "We, therefore, conclude . . . that, whether the seat be styled as property,
personal privilege or license, it is capable of being sold or given away", at 667.
'See (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. ante, p. 1139, discussing a recently decided

case by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Real Estate Co. of Pittsburgh v.
Rudolph, 301 Pa. 502, 153 AtI. 438 (1931), where the court gave to an unsealed

option the same effect as if it had been sealed.
The gift was by father to only child, the latter being the residuary legatee
under the will. The donor orally manifested his intent to make a gift, and this
was followed by his execution of the writing. Note that the owner of a Seat
has no certificate or other tangible representation of his ownership.

RECENT CASES
Held, that the statute creating the tax is unconstitutional as imposing a burden
on interstate commerce. Station WBT v. Pozdnot, 46 F. (2d) 671 (D.C. S. C.
1931).
1
The provision in the Federal Constitution by which the regulation of interstate commerce is reserved for Congress prevents the several states from burdening interstate commerce by taxation The restriction is construed, however,
as permitting the imposition of a state tax in aid of the exercise of the state
police power' or as a tax upon property even where such property is an instrumentality of interstate commerce.' But any tax, no matter what its character
purports to be,' which is in effect a tax upon the privilege of doing interstate
business is rigidly prohibited as an usurpation of federal authority. That radio
transmission constitutes interstate commerce is generally admitted,? and the fact
that Congress has asserted its prerogative over the field of radio affirms the
8
exclusion of the states from any share in its control. The circumstances of
that much of what is
such
radio transmission and reception are necessarily
received originates in other states and there can be no physical separation of the
intra-state material from that which is interstate. A tax on the privilege of
receiving radio communication, therefore, imposes a burden on a totality, the
greatest part of which is contributed by interstate commerce- This is even
more apparent than in the case of a telegraph company as to which it was held
in. Leloup v. Mobile' that a local tax could not be imposed on the privilege of
conducting that business. Conceivably, of course, the court might have construed this tax as one on property, especially since its amount was made dependent on the value of the receiving apparatus,"0 but the avowed purpose of the
statute ' resolves what is always a tenuous issue, against such a view.
I UNITED STATES CoNsTrTUTiox, ART. I, § 8, cl.3.
'Leloup v. Mobile, i27 U. S.640, 8 Sup. Ct. 138o 0888) ; United States
Exp. Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335, 32 Sup. Ct. 211 (1912).
'Atlantic & Pacific Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, i9o U. S. i6o, :23 Sup. Ct.
817 (1903).
'Fargo & Co. v. Nevada, 248 U. S.165, 39 Sup. Ct 6- (i9iS) ; St. Louis
& E. St. L. Elec. R. Co. v. Missouri, 256 U. S.314, 41 Sup. Ct. 488 (i92) ;
People v. Wemple, 138 N. Y. I, 33 N. E. 720 (1893) ; I CooLEY, TAXATION (4th
ed. 194) § 384.
The express purpose of a tax or its form is immaterial if, de facto, it is
a business tax. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. State of Kansas, 216 U. S. I,
30 Sup. Ct. i9o (i9o9) ; Wagner v. City of Covington, 251 U. S.95, 40 Sup. Ct.
93 (i919) ; I CooLEY, op. cit. supra note 4, § 375.
'Kansas City Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. Botkin, 240 U. S.227, 36 Sup. Ct. 261
(1916) ; 2 WILLOUGHBY, CoNsTrruTIONAL LAw (2d ed. 1929) § 622.
" Leloup v. Mobile, sispra note 2; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Speight,
254 U. S. 17, 41 Sup. Ct. 11 (I92o) ; Technical Radio Laboratory v. Federal
Radio Commission, 36 F. (2d) III (App. D. C. 1929).
844 STAT. 1162 (1927), 47 U. S. C. Supp. I, § 8z (199); see Whitehurst v.
Grimes, 21 F. (2d) 787 (D.C. Ky. ig7).
*Supra note 2.
"0Postal Telegraph Co. v. Adams, i5 U. S.688, 15 Sup. Ct. 268 (I895).
""Every person, firm and corporation owning and or operating a radio
receiving set in the State of South Carolina, shall for the privilege of owning
and/or operating such radio receiving set be subject to the payment of a license
tax of . . ." S. C. STAr. AT LARGE 1292 (930).
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JUDGIMENTS-OPENING JUDGMENT AFTER THE END OF TERM-Plaintiff had
obtained a judgment for injuries occasioned by the negligence of the defendant's
son while working for the defendant. After the end of the term defendant
petitioned the court to open the judgment alleging in support thereof that the
defense was taken over by the defendant's insurer who at the date of the trial
merely sent defendant an ambiguous notice to "send" his son; that through
inadvertance the son did not appear at the trial nor did the defendant which
fact was noted on record and the suit was continued ex parte; and that defendant's counsel when learning from one of the witnesses that the plaintiff was
never in the accident complained of, dismissed said witness without offering his
testimony. The plaintiff did not put in any answer to the petition but resisted
the motion on the ground that the judgment was conclusive by reason of the end
of the term. Held, that the alleged facts constitute such extrinsic fraud on
the court and the defendant that the judgment should be opened. Weiner v.
Targan, Ioo Pa. Super. 278 ('93').
The general rule of the common law is that "a court has no power to open,
vacate or set aside a final judgment obtained adversely, after the expiration of
the term at which such judgment was rendered"' because interest rei publice ut
sit finis litium.! "However, the court may open or vacate a judgment even after
the term if such judgment was procured by collusion or fraud where the court
has been imposed upon, or a party deprived of his day in court without fault on
his part or that of his counsel." I It is to be observed that the fraud which is
the basis for the opening of the judgment must be fraud that is extrinsic or
collateral to the issue and not that fraud which it is the duty of every party
to expose at the trial itself.' It is questionable, however, whether the facts of
the present case warrant a conclusion of extrinsic fraud, for had the defendant
been exercising that diligence which any prudent man of business would exercise knowing that a suit was in progress, he would have ascertained the date
of the trial.' The court in the instant case was no doubt greatly influenced

'Cameron v. Roberts, 3 Wheat. (U. S. 1818) 591; McCready v. Gaus, 242

Pa. 364, 89

Ati. 4.59 (1913) ;

LLOYD, CASES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE

(1916)

541

11.73.
2 See U. S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 6I, 65, (1873) ; Kountzs' Appeal, 2
Walk. 458. 464 (Pa. 1878) to the same effect is Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 25
Pac. 97o (i89i).
'U. S. v. Aakervik, i8o Fed. 137 (D. C. Ore. igio); Cochran v. Eldridge,
49 Pa. 365 (1865) ; Wickel v. Mertz, 49 Pa. Super. 472 (1912) ; LLOYD, op. cit.,
supra note 2 at 544 n. 76.
Supro notes i and 3.
"It is not sufficient excuse for a default that defendant's counsel-did not
notify him of the time of the trial, if the defendant himself had actual notice that
the case would probably be tried at a given term, at which it actually was tried."
I BLAcic, JUDGMENTS (2d ed. ioa) § 340. Accord, Leader v. Dunlap, 6 Pa.
Super. 243 (1897).
"When a defendant has been legally served with proper
process he is in court for every purpose connected with the action. It is
then his duty to follow up his case, and take notice of the filing of subsequent
papers in the action . . . and he must ascertain for himself when the case is
put on the calendar or docket for trial, or set down for hearing, and when it is
likely to be reached. If he fails through his own carelessness or lack of vigilant
attention, to obtain notice of the various steps in the action, or of the time

RECENT CASES
by the apparent disregard of that high degree of good faith owed by an insurance company defending a suit to the exclusion of the defendant on record.
While it can easily be seen that this situation presents an emotional justification
for the result, yet logically this fact should be the basis for an action against
the insurance company rather than a sufficient ground for the opening of the
judgment 0 Indirectly the opening of judgment will constitute an action against
the insurance company because it seems that according to the terms of the policy
the insurer was relieved of liability if the insured did not appear at the trial.
Now, however, since there will be a new trial, defendant's appearance will make
the insurance company liable for any losses the defendant might sustain. Although this may prove a just result as between the defendant and the insurer,
it must be kept in mind that the plaintiff may suffer since he has to prove his
case all over again. The principal case, when considered in conjunction with the
cases of Salus v. Fogel, and Liclternmm v. Hanlon; all having been decided
within the short period of approximately ten weeks, shows a marked tendency
of the courts of Pennsylvania to break away from an inexorable application
of the common law rule of the conclusiveness of judgment after the end of the
term, by considering the equities of the factual situation rather than strict legal
precedents.

MORTGAGES-ExTENSiON OF TiziE BY MORTGAGEE TO GRANTEE OF MORTGAGOR As DISCHARGE OF MORTGAGOR'S LIABILITY ON THE BoNi,--Grantee, having

received conveyance from mortgagor with the amount of the bond and mortgage
credited on the purchase price, entered into an agreement with the mortgagee
for an extension of time on the mortgage. Subsequently the mortgagee instituted an action against the mortgagor on the bond for a deficiency existing after
foreclosure and sale of the premises. The mortgagor brought a bill to stay
the mortgagee's action on the ground that the extension of time prejudiced
his interests so as to relieve him from liability on the bond. Held, that the
extension of time did not discharge the mortgagor since the mortgagee had no
notice that the grantee had assumed the bond and mortgage. Gorenberg v. Hunt,

153 Ad. 587 (N. J.

1931).

It may be stated generally that the purchaser of- mortgaged premises
who assumes the mortgage, becomes as to the mortgagor, the principal debtor,
of trial, and consequently suffers a judgment it will not be vacated merely
on that ground," I BLACK, supr § 324. Accord, Culver v. Brinkerhoff, 18o Ill.
548, 54 N. E. 585 (1895) ; Curry v. Janicke, 48 Kan. 168, 29 Pac. 319 (1892) ;
Kamman v. Otto, 34 S. W. 1070 (Ky. 1896) ; Blanse v. Briscoe, 16 Mont. 582, 41
Pac. lo02 (1895).
*N. Y. C. R. R. Co. v. Mass. Bonding etc. Co., 184 N. Y. Supp. 243, 193
App. Div. 438 (I92o); see also Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co., 2io N. Y.
235, 1o4 N. E. 622 (914). Both were cases cited by the court in the principal
case.
, 153 Atl. 547 (Pa. 1931) (judgment, obtained in ex parte suit where
defendant's attorney due to change in office did not receive notice of the date of the
trial, was entered on the last day of the term).
aioo Pa. Super. 245 (193i) (defendant had no notice of trial due to attorney's illness).
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while the mortgagor remains liable as surety,' but the mortgagee, unless he has
assented to the arrangement, may treat both as principal debtors and have a
personal decree against both.? Where the purchaser has not assumed the mortgage debt, an agreement between the mortgagee and grantee to extend the time
of payment does not constitute an assumption of the debt as between the mortgagor and purchaser so as to make the mortgagor a surety.' Where the grantee,
however, has actually assumed the obligation, it is generally held that the
mortgagor is discharged of all liability by the mortgagee's extension of time to
the grantee under an agreement for valuable consideration,' even though such
agreement declares that it shall not operate to impair the mortgagee's security.2
The basis for the rule lies in the fact that the mortgagor is looked upon as a
surety and, hence, due to the delay, has suffered an impairment of his right
of subrogation to sue the principal debtor after the surety shall have himself
paid the debt.' But the authorities in considering the mortgagor a surety
as to the mortgagee, are not unanimous, and a group of cases have been decided
to the contrary on the ground that no agreement between the mortgagor and
grantee can affect the direct contractual relation between the mortgagor and
mortgagee. Thus the mortgagee if he may recover from the grantee recovers
as a third party beneficiary of the grantee's contract with the mortgagor.' Under
this view, therefore, an extension of time would have no effect on the original
obligation of the mortgagor,' and the mortgagee would prevail against him for
the deficiency. In allowing recovery of the deficiency, the court in the instant
1 Clark v. Smallwood, 156 Fed. 409 (W. D. N. Y. 19o7); Burr v. Beers,
24 N. Y. 178 (1861); Lowry v. Hensal, 281 Pa. 572, 127 Atl. 219 (1924);
2 JONES ON MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) §92o.
'Shepherd v. May, 115 U. S. 505, 6 Sup. Ct. 119 (1885); Sime v. Lewis,
112 Minn. 403, 128 N. W. 468 (191o) ; JONES, 70c. cit. subra note I.
In Pennsylvania a statute prohibits one not a party to the agreement from
suing even on an express assumption of liability, the promisor being liable only
to the person with whom the agreement is made. Act of June 12, 1878, P. L.
205, § 2, PA. STAT. (West, 192o) § 18,855. For full discussion of right of a
mortgagee to recover in Pa., see Note (917), 65 U. OF PA. L. REv. 791. The
promise of the grantee is merely made to indemnify the grantor and, therefore,
it cannot enure to the benefit of the mortgagee, Sloan v. Kline, 230 Pa. 132,
79 Atl. 4o3 (1911) ; Tritten's Estate, 238 Pa. 555, 86 Atd. 461 (1913).
'Feigenbaum v. Hizsnay, 187 App. Div. 126, 175 N. Y. Supp. 223 (1919).
'Union L. Ins. Co. v. Hanford, 143 U. S. 187, 12 Sup. Ct 437 (1892);
Metzger v. Nova Realty Co., 214 N. Y. 26, lO7 N. E. io27 (ii5). But see
Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 61o, IO Sup. Ct. 494 (189o); WILIsToN, WALD'S
POLLOCK ON CONTRACTS

(I906)

264.

'Keller v. Ashford, supra note 4; Clement v. Willett, 105 Minn. 267, 117
N. W. 491 (19o8) ; Greene v. Stone, 54 N. 3. Eq. 387, 34 Atl. lO99 (1896).
'Metzger v. Nova Realty Co., supra note 4; Maier v. Thorman, 234 S. W.
239 (Tex. 1921).

'Corbett v. Waterman, ii Ia. 86 (186o) ; Seeman v. Mills, 197 Ill. App.
589 (1916) ; Crawford v. Edwards, 33 Mich. 354 (1876).
'Waters v. Hubbard, 44 Conn. 340 (1877); Crawford v. Edwards, .rupra
note 8; JONES, op. cit. supra note I, §921; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS (1920)
3F6.
,Cases supra note 2; see Morganroth v. Pink, 227 Ill. App. 244 (1922).
But see Calvo v. Davies, 73 N. Y. 211 (1878).

RECENT CASES
,ase, however, indicates no intention to adopt this latter view, but rather purports to go upon the strict equitable doctrine previously considered. Although
there is authority for the holding of the court that the mortgagor is not discharged where there is no notice that the grantee has become the principal
debtor," it would seem that this is consistent only with the third party beneficiary view. According to the equitable or surety doctrine it appears that it
would be repugnant to allow the mortgagee to impair the equitable right of the
mortgagor to collect by subrogation from the granteeU and still protect the
mortgagee's rights against the surety. The court indicates, however, that it
would recognize authority' to the effect that the mortgagor is discharged to
the extent that the property has depreciated in value since the original due date
of the mortgage. Although the principal case may be taken to indicate a
departure from the general practice of the New Jersey courts to apply the strict
equitable doctrine,' with a tendency toward the third party contract beneficiary
theory, its object in favoring mortgagees' rights on mortgage obligations is
undoubtedly equitable. At all events, there is the practical consideration, as
outlined by the court in the instant case in language strikingly analogous to
that used in the Pennsylvania case of Willock's Estate," to the effect that
the mortgagor can suffer no harm by an extension of time that must in the last
analysis be as beneficial to his interests as to those of the mortgagee.'

NEGLIGENCE--DuTY OF CARE OF AN INFANT Dniva-Suit by a father for

the wrongful death of his son alleged to have been caused by the negligent
operation of an automobile by the defendant, a seventeen year old licensed driver.
Plaintiff excepted to the charge that the defendant "should be judged according
to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience". Held, that the
verdict for the defendant be affirmed since the charge was correct. Charbonnai
v. MacRury et al., 153 At. 457 (N. H. ig3i).

In the determination of the care required of minors for the safety of others
the bulk of theoretical opinion favors an analogy to the standard 'of care required of them for self-protection. The proponents of this view do not stress
10Metz v. Todd, 36 Mich. 473 (i877) ; JONES, 10c. cit. supra note I.
u Murray v. Marshall, 94 N. Y. 611 (1884) ; Metzger v. Nora Realty Co.,
supra note 4.
Principal case at 587.
'3Eakin v. Schultz, 6i N. J. Eq. I56, 47 At. 274 (igoo); Holland Reformed Society v. De Lazier, 84 N. J. Eq. 442, 93 AUt. igg (i915).
"58 Pa. Super. i59, 169 (914).
But see Calvo v. Davies, supra note io (surety discharged by extension
of time, and the court will not enter into the question of what injury the surety
has sustained).
IBOHLEN. STUDIES IN THE LAw oF TORTS (1926) r43. 57: 2 COOLEY,
TORTS (3d ed. igo6) 1469; SALMtOND, LAW OF TORTS (7th ed. 1928) 83; I
THOMPsoN, NEGLIGENCE (2d ed. 19oi) 37; RESTATEFENT OF THE LAw OF
ToRrs (Am. L. Inst. Tentative Draft No. 4, 1929) § 167, Comment e. Contra:
Terry, Negligence (1915), 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, 47.
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the point that there may possibly be a distinction drawn between contributory
and actionable negligence. They point to the desirability of fostering the natural growth of children by withholding from them the burden of adult responsibility. There is sound support for this view in the fact that the infirmities
of infants, although progressively variable, are objectively apparent and, therefore, susceptible of ascertainment. One is not likely to anticipate from those
engaged in children's activities the exercise of mature judgment to determine
whether their conduct may or may not be dangerous to others.' The very
scarcity of litigated cases belies a different attitude on the part of the layman.
The principal case brings the total to three,' the majority agreeing with the opinion of writers on the subject. But while admitting the merits of the principle
one may be inclined to query its application to the particular facts of the
present case. The defendant was engaged in activity requiring not only adult
intelligence and judgment but special skill. The other cases concerned activities peculiar to children.' As to the driving of automobiles there is present
neither the desire to foster normal development of children nor the objective
sanction of appearances. It may be true, as the court stated, that, "The authorized license is not a certificate . . . of the mental maturity of the eligible
minor.'" This, however, does not negative the fact that the legislature has
provided expressly by its requirements for a license a definite standard by which
the conduct of all the members of the class can be tested. Further, it is socially
desirable that those who choose to operate instrumentalities of known potential
danger be made to conform to high standards o.f care.' It would seem, therefore,
that there is nothing to be gained by treating minors of this class with especial
leniency.
supra note 2 (Special Note).
'Ibid.; Cooz, sutpr note 2, at i47o.
'In Neal v. Gillett, 23 Conn. 437 (I855), two boys, thirteen and sixteen
years old respectively, playing ball, carelessly frightened a horse. The majority
of the court refused to take their infancy into consideration, saying, "The
youngest of these defendants was thirteen years of age, and in the absence of all
proof to the contrary, must be presumed to have been emancipated from the
dominion of mere childish instincts; and we think it would be mischievous
to hold that persons of the age of thirteen years are, on account of their youth
alone, absolved from the obligation to exercise their rights with ordinary care";
see Roberts v. Ring, 143 Minn. 151, 153, 173 N. W. 437, 438 (i919)
(refused
to consider defects of sight and hearing of a seventy-seven year old defendant).
In Briese v. Maechtle, 146 Wis. 89, 13o N. W. 893 (1911) a ten year old boy
playing tag injured a nine year old boy playing at marbles. Here the court
considered the defendant's youth; see also Bradley v. Andrews, 51 Vt. 530,
'RESTATEAIENT OF THE LAW OF ToRTs,

533 (i879) ; Gulf Ry. Co. v. McWhirter, 77 Tex. 356, 360, r4 S. W. 26, 27

(18go) ; Bullock v. Babcock, 3 Wend. 391, 394 (N. Y. 1829).
'Neal v. Gillett, Briese v. Maechtle, both supra note 4.
"Principal case, at 464, on motion for rehearing. The court admits that
"The purpose of the Legislature was the protection of the traveling public.
This is accomplished by imposing certain positive limitations of the right to
operate cars upon the public highways". From this its conclusion would seem
to be a non sequitur. Further, the court, in applying its theory of analogy to the
test in contributory negligence cases, cited no such case to justify its conclusion
in which
the plaintiff was a licensed minor.
1
Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective? (I927) 41 Hav. L. REv.
z, 26.
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PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-CoNSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS-LABILITY OF AGENT FOR
ABUSE OF His FDucrARY RELATIONSHIP-An agent negotiated with a third
party for the sale of his principal's stock, but no agreement was reached. The
agent, in the course of the negotiations, learned that the third party would
later pay more than the market price, which fact he concealed from his principal. The principal who was in financial difficulties sold the stock to the agent

at the market price. The agent bought this stock for others and organized a
pool which bought in more of that stock. This caused the price to rise, and
later, the stock was sold at a large profit for the pool. The principal sues the
agent for the share of profit attributable to the shares he sold the agent. Held,
that the principal could recover only the personal profit made by the agent
from the pool. Laingr v. Chrichton, 156 S. E, 746 (W. Va. 193I).
An agent is under a duty to disclose fully valuable information that he
learns as a result of the performance of his duties 1 If due to the non-disclosure
of pertinent facts, the principal suffers a loss, the agent is liable for that loss
in an action at law.' An agent being a fiduciary,3 cannot, in the absence of
the consent of his principal, utilize particular information gathered in the performance of his duties, so as to yield himself a profit or other advantage.'
As in other fiduciary relationships,' such profit is turned over to the principal
either by an accounting' or by constructing a trust in the favor of the principal.7 In the instant case, therefore, the court was correct in awarding the
principal all the profit made by his agent. On the other hand, since the principal sold the stock at the market price he suffered no loss, and therefore there
could be no recovery on the ground of damages. It is true, however, that the
principal, if he had waited, could have made a profit, but the fact was that
he was in financial difficulties and hence had to sell when he did. If this fact
were not present, the court would have been confronted with a difficult problem
in determining whether the principal could recover for the profits he could have
'Calmon
AGENCY (2d

v. Sarraille, 142 Cal. 638, 76 Pac. 486 (1qO4);
ed. I914) § 12o7.

I MECHEM,

I Emmons v. Alvord, 177 Mass. 466, 59 N. E. 126 (I9OI) ; Holmes v. Cathcart, 88 Minn. 213 N. V. 0.56 (i9o3).

'Hemenway

v. Abbott, 8 Cal. App.

TRusrs AND TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929)

450,

§ 206.

97 Pac. igo (I9O8);

I PERRY,

'Hegenmyer v. Marks, 37 Minn. 6, 32 N. W. 785 (1887); 2 POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. x918) § 959.

'Horn Pond Ice Co. v. Pearson, i66 N. E. 640 (Mass. 1929) (employer and
employee); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 164 N. E. 545 (1928) (joint
venturers) ; Chiswell v. Campbell, Adm'r, 300 Pa. 68, 15o Aft. 9o (I93O)
(trustee and cestui); (iq29) 42 HARV. L. REv. 935; (1929) 28 MICH. L. REv.
9.5. In their abhorrence against cheating, one court has even extended the principle to a case where the parties dealt at arms length, which is probably the
farthest the principle has been extended. Shellmar Products Co. v. AllenQualley Co., 36 F. (2d) 623 (C. C. A. 7th 1929).
"Smith v. Elderton. 16 Cal. App. 424, 117 Pac. 563 (igii); Tilleny v.

Wolverton, 46 Minn. 256, 48 N. W. 9o8 (i8gi).
IForlaw v. Augusta Naval Stores, 124 Ga. 26r, 52 S. E. 898 (1o95) ; Fox v.
Simons, 251 Ill. 316, 96 N. E. 233 (igi) ; Leader Pub. Co. v. Grant Trust &
Savings Co., iS Ind. 651, io8 N. E. 121 (1915).
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made in addition to the profits that the agent made. Though it is true that
equity, once it has jurisdiction, will retain it so as to give full relief,8 it will not
award more than an accounting for profits if the damages suffered by the plaintiff overlap or are coextensive with the profits of the wrongdoer.' Similarly
in the instant case, any additional profit that the principal could have made by
selling at a higher price, would coincide in part with the profit made by the
agent, which profit the agent is forced to surrender to the principal. It would be
obviously inequitable to award both, and therefore in such a case, the principal
should be given the alternative of selecting which of the two remedies he
desires."

81 Po

tRoy, op. cit. supra note 4 § 181.
'In L. Martin Co. v. L. Martin & Wilckes Co., 75 N. J.Eq. 257, 72 Atl.

294 (19o9),

though the case deals with unfair competition, the court gives

voice to an equitable holding which could with no difficulty be applied to the
hypothetical situation discussed under the principal case, saying "Damages of
complainant would include profits which he has lost, but to award him not
only those profits by way of damages, but also the profits which the defendant
actually gained by the sales, would permit of double compensation."
"°Cf. L. Martin Co. v. L. Martin & Wilckes Co., supra note 9, where the
court said that the plaintiff had the alternative of suing at law for damages,
or bringing a bill in equity for an accounting of profits

